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Abstract  This paper explores the institutional dimension for the implementation of EU FTAs from a 
fundamental rights perspective. Given the plethora of entities created by the new generation of 
EU FTAs, this paper investigates the extent to which the institutional architecture of EU FTAs 
is designed to protect and promote fundamental rights. Starting from the question of what it 
means studying fundamental rights in this dimension, the paper proceeds to assess values of 
participation, representation, deliberation and accountability that can contribute to fundamental 
rights in an institutional setting beyond the State. To do so, it examines the mandate, 
membership and decision-making powers of the treaty bodies of EU FTAs. It argues that while 
the EU has made important steps towards these principles, several omissions reveal that it still 
lags behind in providing an institutional design that truly embeds the values that could help 
safeguard and promote fundamental rights at the implementation stage. 
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1. Introduction  
Institution-building beyond the State is the deepest and last level of governance of EU FTAs: it enables the 
other dimensions to become “alive” and not to remain words within a text. The creation of an institutional 
framework for the implementation of EU FTAs is what makes the FTAs operational. Institutions produce 
“living agreements” that can endure and that may give rise to a new legal order, by way of legal outputs and 
exchanges arising from institutionalised practices and cooperation.1 The new generation EU FTAs have created 
a plethora of new entities. What kind of institutions these are, how they work and based on what aims and 
values, are all questions that have been largely neglected by the literature on EU external trade. Institutions 
have been the focus of literature on international relations, sociology and organisational studies, while legal 
accounts have been limited to legalisation, compliance and enforcement issues. This paper aims to provide a 
different account of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs: it asks how to study fundamental rights in 
relation to institutions beyond the State and conducts such examination. 
The literature attaches a series of advantages to institutions:2 from assuaging uncertainty and concerns of 
delegation of authority;3 to prompting positive practices of transparency4 and enabling forums for sharing 
information and linking issues together.5 Yet, as the extensive literature on democratisation beyond the State 
reveals, they equally raise concerns of legitimacy.6 It has been argued that despite the rhetoric of fundamental 
rights surrounding institutionalisation processes of economic integration, the resulting institutions will not 
necessarily embed fundamental rights; and, in fact, in most cases these will be kept at bay.7 Drawing from this 
debate, the central question in this paper is: to what extent is the institutional architecture for the 
implementation of EU FTAs designed to protect fundamental rights? To provide an answer, the following sub-
questions are addressed: does this institutional architecture take into account fundamental rights? How does it 
differ across trade partners? What are its limits? What could be improved to make it better equipped to deal 
with fundamental rights? 
The aim of this paper is to engage in positive and normative explorations of the relationship between the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs and fundamental rights. The way implementation is carried out in 
practice, and following which institutional design, is assessed here in terms of values that could help safeguard 
fundamental rights. According to Keohane, strengthening institutions so that they reflect legitimate social 
purposes is a major challenge for our time.8 Whilst not longing for the perfect model, this paper advances a 
series of considerations having in mind the protection of fundamental rights, and sheds light on the elements 
to take into account to this end. By highlighting omissions in decision-making, in the members and in the 
                                               
1 Marija Bartl, ‘Making transnational markets: the institutional politics behind the TTIP’ (2016), Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper No. 2016-64, 2. 
2 Alec Stone Sweet and others, ‘The Institutionalization of European Space’, in Alec Stone Sweet and others (eds), The 
institutionalization of Europe (OUP 2001).  
3 Michael Zürn, ‘The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions’ (2014) 6 European Political Science Review 
47. 
4 Vigjilenca Abazi, ‘Transparency in the Institutionalisation of Transatlantic Relations: Dynamics of Official Secrets and Access to 
Information in Security and Trade’ in Elaine Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation State: Transatlantic Relations: Data, 
Privacy and Trade Law (Springer 2018). 
5 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Robert Keohane: Political Theorist’ in Helen V Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds), Power, Interdependence, 
and Nonstate Actors in World Politics (Princeton University Press 2009) 254. 
6 See i.a. Michael Zürn, ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation-state: The EU and other international institutions’ (2000) 6 
European Journal of International Relations 183; Joshua Cohen and Charles F Sabel, ‘Global Democracy’ (2004) 37 NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics 763; James K Boyce, ‘Democratizing global economic governance’ (2004) 35 Development and 
Change 593; Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Reinventing global democracy’ (2014) 20 European Journal of International Relations 3; Jan 
Wouters, Antoon Braeckman, Matthias Lievens and Emilie Bécault (eds), Global Governance and Democracy: A Multidisciplinary 
Analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); Daniele Archibugi and Marco Cellini, ‘The Internal and External Levers to Achieve 
Global Democracy’ (2017) 8 Global Policy 65; Steven Wheatley, ‘A Democratic Rule of International Law’ (2011) 22 European 
Journal of International Law 525. 
7 Marcilio Toscano Franca-Filho and others, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights in Latin American FTAs and MERCOSUR: An 
Exploratory Agenda’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 811, 822-823. 
8 Robert O Keohane, ‘Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism’ (2012) 26 International Relations 125. 
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mandate, it argues that the institutional design of EU FTAs suffers from several limitations, leading to the 
prediction that at the implementation stage fundamental rights will be disregarded.  
The paper is structured as follows. It starts by providing the analytical framework for the study of fundamental 
rights in the institutional architecture of EU FTAs. It analyses, in turn, the treaty bodies for the implementation 
of EU FTAs and those institutionalising civil society participation in this process. The paper first analyses 
these bodies through the lenses of the analytical framework, hence providing a first descriptive overview. It 
then highlights the main problems arising from a fundamental rights perspective. Finally, it engages in a 
normative evaluation of the analysis against values of participation, representation, deliberation and 
accountability. It shows that the proliferation of treaty bodies for the implementation of EU FTAs has not 
equated with an institutional architecture that embeds and strives for these principles. 
2. Analytical Framework 
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which the institutional architecture of EU FTAs is designed to 
protect fundamental rights. The question of where to search and how to explore fundamental rights in relation 
to entities for the implementation of EU FTAs is not a straightforward exercise. A major methodological 
challenge in this regard is the question of how to study fundamental rights in the institutional dimension of EU 
FTAs: how can we conceptualise and then analyse the relationship between the institutional architecture of EU 
FTAs and fundamental rights? How do we go about assessing the protection of fundamental rights in this 
dimension? These are all questions at the centre of the analytical framework that is developed next.  
2.1. The Relevance of Institutions and Institutional Design 
Unpacking the research question for analytical purposes first requires to explain what is meant by ‘institutional 
architecture of EU FTAs’. The latter is understood here to consist of the entities whose creation is the result of 
provisions in EU FTAs. Speaking of ‘institutional architecture’ then is a deliberate choice deriving from an 
understanding of these entities as institutions. Treaty bodies of EU FTAs in fact defy classic taxonomies of 
institutions provided by IR scholars or social sciences:9 they are not international institutions proper,10 nor are 
they informal rules and organised practices impacting behaviour, as assumed by sociology11 and political 
organisation theories.12 In a spectrum ranging from formal international institutions to informal rules, the treaty 
bodies of EU FTAs sit somewhere in the middle: they are formal bodies of rules which set up the stage for 
cooperation and exchanges, forming expectations with an impact on human behaviour and political action.  
Provided the understanding of treaty bodies as institutions, the present exploration can avail itself of insights 
from theories on institutions that help depict a bigger picture of why we have institutions, how they evolve and 
how institutional change is triggered. Above all, they share the proposition that, within these processes, 
institutional design matters. Several IR scholars, especially from functionalist and power-based theories, agree 
that institutional design matters for it affects outcome;13 it creates and reproduces political power.14 Rational 
                                               
9 See Hans Keman, ‘Approaches to the Analysis of Institutions’, in Bernard Steunenberg and Frans van Vught (eds), Political 
Institutions and Public Policy (Springer 1997). 
10 Robert O Keohane and others, After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Harvard 
University Press 1993); Robert O Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ (1998) 110 Foreign Policy 82. 
11 Sabine Saurugger and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Does European Integration Theory Need Sociology?’ (2010) 8 Comparative European 
Politics 1; Keman (n 9) 3. 
12 Johan P Olsen, Governing through Institution Building: Institutional Theory and Recent European Experiments in Democratic 
Organization (OUP 2010) 36. 
13 Barbara Koremenos and others, The Rational Design of International Institutions (CUP 2009); Ronald B Mitchell, ‘The Influence 
of International Institutions: Institutional Design, Compliance, Effectiveness and Endogeneity’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 5) 66; 
Randall W Stone, ‘Institutions, Power, and Interdependence’, in Milner (n 5) 43. 
14 Alexander Wendt, ‘Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design’ in Koremenos and others 
(n 13) 275. 
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choice institutionalism similarly holds that the design of institutions will reflect their creators’ endeavour to 
defend their interests rationally. It thus answers the ‘why’ questions, relating to e.g. why institutions have a 
particular institutional design.15 Historical institutionalism, conversely, focuses on the consequences of a 
certain institutional design for the functioning of an institution. It helps answer the ‘how’ questions as to their 
evolution: institutional designs will shape the behaviour and practices of the members of an institution, how 
they will interact with other actors, and how they will set their preferences. Also for scholars of political 
organisation institutional designs matter, as they are tools that can improve politics and society, capable of 
emancipating, empowering, regulating and constraining actors.16  
Based on these theoretical insights, institutional design is held here to matter. Whilst IR and rational choice 
theories have focused on explaining a particular institutional design,17 Wendt has pointed out that “what makes 
the issue of institutional design compelling is that it does raise big questions beyond the explanatory one.”18 
Building on scholarly calls to look forward rather than backwards, this paper engages in both positive and 
normative analysis:19 it assesses how a given institutional design impacts and contributes to fundamental rights, 
while reflecting on how to design institutions for a particular normative purpose.20 Institutional design is 
defined here as comprising the rules that stipulate how the treaty bodies of EU FTAs are to function.21 These 
treaty rules are informative of the extent to which the emerging institutional architecture of EU FTAs takes 
into account and protects fundamental rights. Underlying such exploration is the premise that institutions have 
the potential to work for the protection of fundamental rights by means of institutional design.  
This paper advances two main ways in which institutions may do so: by formalising legitimate procedures and 
by creating policy space for initiatives on fundamental rights. Institutions can shape and stabilise procedures, 
practices, and cooperation.22 They are liable to influence the behaviour and preferences of their members, not 
least outcomes. This is relevant for fundamental rights insofar as the procedures that are institutionalised 
guarantee their protection. At the same time, scholars also speak about policy areas where institutionalisation 
is taking place.23 They find the potential of institution-building to create policy space that would not otherwise 
emerge.24 Hence treaty bodies are also liable to account for the development of specific policy fields,25 which 
in the case of present exploration could relate to initiatives benefiting, or directly pertaining, to fundamental 
rights. From this perspective, the institutional design is called into question and assessed in its implications for 
fundamental rights.26 Possible alternatives are also considered, which could contribute to the normative 
relationship between institutional design and fundamental rights. 
                                               
15 Koremenos and others (n 13) 762; Mitchell (n 13) 66; Stone (n 13) 43. 
16 Olsen (n 12) 24, 36-37, 66. 
17 As pointed out by Charles B Roger, The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, 
and Why It Matters (OUP 2020) 56. 
18 Wendt (n 14). 
19 Ibid; Robert O Keohane, ‘Governance in a Partially Globalized World’ (2001) 95 American Political Science Review 1. 
20 Robert O Keohane, ‘Big Questions in the Study of World Politics’, in Robert E Goodin, The Oxford Handbook of Political Science 
(OUP 2011). 
21 Issues of institutional design include i.a. whether the rules are informal or legalised, whether the commitments are permanent or 
time-bound, and whether decision-making is participatory or centralised. See Helen V Milner, ‘Power, Interdependence and Nonstate 
Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 5) 20; Stone (n 13) 41. See also Marija Bartl (n 1). 
22 Fahey (n 4) 4. 
23 Fahey (n 4); Vinod K Aggarwal, ‘The Dynamics of Trade Liberalization’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 5). 
24 Stone Sweet and others (n 2). 
25 Fahey (n 4) 4. 
26 What this paper is not concerned with is the effectiveness of institutions, if understood in the sense that treaty bodies should 
achieve the purpose for which they were created (see e.g. Timothy J McKeown, ‘The Big Influence of Big Allies: Transgovernmental 
Relations as a Tool of Statecraft’ in Milner and Moravcsik (n 5); Stephen Woolcock, ‘EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in 
the 2000s: A Reorientation towards Commercial Aims’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 718, 726): the objectives of treaty bodies  
are often limited to implementation of the FTA, and it has been shown in the previous chapters that, in terms of fundamental rights, 
very little is there. One angle would be to consider potential for compliance with the TSD chapter, which is yet not the aim of this 
paper. This paper is also not concerned with the incentives for such compliance, nor for creating treaty bodies (see e.g. Koremenos 
and others (n 13)), since the latter are taken as the independent variables for the implications on fundamental rights. 
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2.2. Studying Fundamental Rights in the Institutional Architecture of EU 
FTAs 
The question of how to nderstand the normative relationship between institutional design and fundamental 
rights constitutes an important methodological challenge. The most pressing question institutional designers 
are faced with is a normative one, and relates to what values should be pursued in institutions.27 While 
fundamental rights could virtually represent such values, it is hard to see how they could be pursued, as such, 
in institutions; it is not clear what prescriptions they would imply as to matters of institutional design. To come 
to terms with this methodological challenge, fundamental rights are explored here by proxy of other values 
that the literature has indicated as being important for fundamental rights in governance arrangements beyond 
the State.  
2.2.1. Values for Fundamental Rights in Institutions Beyond the State 
The present analysis normatively targets values of participation, representation, deliberation and 
accountability. Above all, they are core normative qualities of democratic systems which can contribute to 
ensure that fundamental rights are safeguarded and promoted.28 The elaboration around them does not claim 
to be exhaustive; they have been discussed extensively in the literature on democracy beyond the State.29 The 
aim is rather to provide a roadmap for analysis and suggestions for institutional change. In governance 
arrangements beyond the State, participation and representation are key to ensure political control and 
citizens’ interests. Both are pivotal for democratic systems beyond the State where, in De Búrca’s words, the 
“pursuit of the public interest (…) can never be assumed.”30 Participation is understood here as the possibility 
for different stakeholders to have a role and take part in the operation of an institution, including to have a say 
in decision-making processes.31 Given the limits of full participation beyond the State, representation is what 
allows citizens to have other actors speaking for them and representing their interests, above all their 
fundamental rights. Deliberation then is the process that, according to political theory, enables discussion 
among different participants on issues of social concern.32 This is precisely the level where concerns on 
fundamental rights could be expressed and policy space originate. Finally, as to accountability, the focus is on 
one of its many aspects: what ensures that decision-makers provide reasons for their decisions and are 
answerable for the results.33 Accountability is next to the other values in providing mechanisms so that the 
concerns expressed are followed up. In order to observe how, or in what form, these values are present in the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs, the following analytical elements of institutional design have been 
selected: membership, mandate and decision-making powers.  
Values for Fundamental Rights Analytical element 
Participation and Representation  Membership  
Deliberation  Mandate  
Accountability  Decision-making powers  
Table No.1: Values for Fundamental Rights and respective Analytical elements. 
                                               
27 Wendt (n 14) 262. 
28 Johnathan W Kuyper, ‘Global democratization and international regime complexity’ (2014) 20 European Journal of International 
Relations 624. 
29 See n 6.  
30 Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101, 132. 
31 Stewart draws a difference between non-decisional and decisional participation: the former is limited to providing input, the latter 
also involves a role in decision-making. See Richard B Stewart, ‘Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: 
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness’ (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 211. 
32 See Jennifer L Eagan, ‘Deliberative democracy’, Encyclopædia Britannica (17 May 2016), available at 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/deliberative-democracy>.  
33 De Búrca (n 30). 
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2.2.2. Analytical elements  
Membership, scope of the mandate and decision-making powers can tell us something about what can be found 
regarding the values for fundamental rights (Table No.1). Membership has been chosen for it is informative of 
participation and representation.34 In this study, it relates to who has been delegated to carry out the tasks of 
a given treaty body.35 IR scholars tell us that membership is “an endogenous design choice”36 which determines 
who is to have a say in agenda-setting.37 As institutionalism would emphasise, interactions with other 
institutions and actors will also be relevant. This analytical dimension then leads to consider who can contribute 
to the work of a treaty body and influence its agenda. Treaty provisions that stipulate who belongs to the treaty 
bodies and who can join them will eventually determine who controls the agenda, and thus influence the 
outcomes.38  
The scope of the mandate has been selected for its link to deliberation. The objectives that these treaty bodies 
have been set up to achieve will determine how the members will understand their role and what they will 
decide or discuss upon.39 The mandate provides the basis on which the members are expected and legitimated 
to act. As suggested by institutionalist theories, the institutional design of an institution will determine the 
preferences of its members and their behaviour over time. In this case, the breadth and degree of clarity of the 
scope will determine how much discretion the members of a body will have as to the agenda items to be 
discussed. Like membership, also this analytical dimension has an impact on agenda-setting and outcome.40  
Finally, decision-making powers has been selected to look at the level of accountability of those involved in 
decision-making. As Wendt has pointed out, choices about institutional design are choices about who is 
empowered, or not, to make decisions.41 Institutionalism also suggests that the way decision-making processes 
are designed has a bearing on how different actors interact, with an impact on policy development.42 Hence it 
will be relevant whether decision-making is undertaken by some actors alone or in concert with others.43 In 
this dimension, the analysis is particularly interested in the degree of centralisation of decision-making, namely 
the extent to which decision-making powers are concentrated within a particular authoritative group or whether 
they are distributed or dispersed away from it.44 This analytical dimension enables better understanding 
accountability because a finding of centralised decision-making powers will allow to identify the decision-
makers who are expected to provide reasons for their decisions and to identify mechanisms to this effect. At 
the same time, even where the decision-making process is concentrated in one institution, one can expect that 
the longer the reporting chain for other actors to provide input, the more difficult it will be to identify who is 
to hold to account to justify a certain conduct or a certain policy outcome. 
These analytical elements are explored in the institutional design of the treaty bodies of EU FTAs. They are 
used as a basis to engage in a normative evaluation of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs. Each can be 
understood as a sort of void unit of measurement that needs to be filled with normativity to understand what 
‘an institutional architecture for fundamental rights’ would look like. To this aim, the questions underlying the 
analysis will be, for instance, what type of membership guarantees participation and representation that can 
                                               
34 Stone (n 13) 41. 
35 Membership is not understood as it typically is under IR literature, i.e. how many (or which) States belong to an international 
institution. See Koremenos and others (n 13) 770. 
36 Koremenos and others (n 13) 778-779. 
37 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University 
Press 1998). 
38 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Robert Keohane: Political Theorist’ in Milner and Moravcsik (n 5) 256; Elmer E Schattschneider, The Semi-
Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (Dryden Press 1975). 
39 Bartl (n 1). 
40 Koremenos and others (n 13) 770. 
41 Wendt (n 14) 275. 
42 Mark Dawson, ‘Fundamental Rights in European Union Policy-making: The Effects and Advantages of Institutional Diversity’ 
(2020) 20 Human Rights Law Review 50. 
43 Koremenos and others (n 13) 771. 
44 Stone (n 13). 
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contribute to fundamental rights? The next paragraph proceeds to qualify these analytical elements for what 
could be understood as an institutional architecture of EU FTAs for fundamental rights. 
2.2.3. Qualifying the Analytical Elements for an Institutional Architecture for Fundamental 
Rights 
An institutional architecture for fundamental rights is conceived here as one that can contribute to not neglect, 
and instead safeguards, fundamental rights. This could be reflected in institutions that were underpinned by 
institutional designs that are guided by values for fundamental rights, rather than the effectiveness of a policy, 
for instance.45 Depending on what we can find about these values in the institutional architecture of EU FTAs, 
we can assess the extent to which they are embedded therein.  
Starting from the question of what kind membership enables participation that can work for fundamental rights, 
one can argue that those affected and “subjected” should have the right to give their input and take part in the 
decision-making process, directly or through representatives.46 Citizens as well as nonstate actors and 
parliaments should be afforded institutional bodies and/or meaningful venues: not only to voice concerns 
related to fundamental rights, but also to interact with decisional bodies, if not to take part in the decision-
making process themselves. This would also contribute to the politicisation of institutions, which can enhance 
the quality of decision-making47 and make it difficult to overlook rights-based concerns.48 At the same time, 
as De Búrca argues, a democratic system of governance beyond the State is “incomplete by design”, as full 
participation cannot be achieved “other than in a process of continuous revision.”49 Drawing on her conception 
of democratically-striving governance, modalities of participation should be open to ongoing striving and self-
correction.50   
Similarly, on membership that can lead to representation working for fundamental rights, it should be possible 
for citizens to be represented by domestic interest groups, especially competing voices to national 
governments, such as legislatures and NGOs.51 Constructivist perspectives emphasise the role of nonstate 
actors in bringing about normative discourses and change.52 Research has shown that civil society actors have 
the ability to influence and alter the institutional agenda.53 Institutions, in turn, have been depicted as “the 
indispensable companion of civil society”.54 Examining membership then informs as to the potential of the 
institutional design to empower nonstate actors, and in turn the possibility for nonstate actors to influence the 
agenda. In this sense, they can be instrumental for institutional innovation, deliberation on fundamental rights 
and development of new policy areas. 
On the mandate, it is important that aims of fundamental rights are included in the general objectives of the 
institutions, or in their specific tasks, so that deliberation can touch upon issues more or less directly related 
to them. Regarding the general objectives of the institutions, these could include commitments not to 
undermine fundamental rights, but they could also endorse procedural good governance principles for an 
                                               
45 De Búrca (n 30). 
46 Wheatley (n 6) 542. 
47 Michael Zurn and others (n 3). 
48 Dawson (n 42) 51. 
49 De Búrca (n 30) 131-132. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘The interplay between actors as determinant of the evolution of administrative law in international institutions’ 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 319. 
52 Keck and Sikkink (n 37); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’ (2001) 4 Annual Review of Political Science 391. 
53 Jutta M Joachim, Agenda setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender violence and reproductive rights (Georgetown University Press 
2007); Charli Carpenter, ‘Setting the advocacy agenda: Theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy 
networks’ (2007) 51 International Studies Quarterly 99. 
54 And along with practices of democracy, necessary for legal and political reforms aimed at empowering civil society. See Francesca 
Bignami, ‘Theories of civil society and global Administrative Law: the case of the World Bank and international development’ in 
Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 327. 
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institutional dimension that is socially legitimate.55 Regarding the tasks of the institutions, it should be clear 
what their role may be vis-à-vis fundamental rights: institutions could be required i.a. to provide concrete 
proposals, as well as to monitor the impact of a certain decision, policy or provision, on fundamental rights. 
Not only could this work towards not neglecting fundamental rights; it could also lead to the creation of policy 
space in their favour.  
Finally, for decision-making powers, what is relevant from a fundamental rights perspective is that decision-
makers are bound by mechanisms whereby they can be held to account and answerable as to their decisions. 
While many definitions and mechanisms for accountability exist, all have in common an ex post dimension 
whereby decision-makers are called on to justify a certain conduct, which should incentivise ex ante 
consideration of the interests of the account holders.56 Mechanisms to this effect should be considered. In this 
regard, the scholarship on Global and Administrative Law could represent a useful benchmark.57 Furthermore, 
where decision-making is centralised, it should come with close interaction, if not decisional participation, of 
parliaments and civil society actors, whose views should not remain abstract but duly followed up or given 
reasons for not to. The next section first analyses the institutional bodies of the latest trade initiatives of the 
EU with the US, Canada, Singapore and Japan.58 
 
3. Treaty Bodies for the Implementation of EU FTAs 
The institutional architecture of EU FTAs includes, above all, the treaty bodies set out under the specific 
institutional chapters; as well as other entities envisaged in the FTA, yet outside the institutional chapters. All 
the FTAs under investigation feature institutional chapters: they create and elaborate on the duties of a Joint 
Committee and also establish Specialised committees. The institutional chapters also often envisage the setting 
up of working groups and contact points, which are not examined here. With the only exception of TTIP,59 
institutional chapters do not include the Civil Society Forum and the Domestic Advisory Groups: these are part 
of the chapters on trade and sustainable development (TSD).60 In this overview, EUSFTA emerges as the most 
atypical FTA: it does not establish a Specialised committee on TSD, but a board; nor does it foresee the creation 
of a committee on regulatory cooperation, chiefly because there is no chapter on that. EUSFTA is also the only 
agreement not envisaging a Civil Society Forum. By contrast, TTIP is unique in its recognition of the 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, and its endeavour to foster the Parliamentary dimension of the 




                                               
55 Olsen (n 12). 
56 Stewart (n 31) 246. 
57 It provides mechanisms, practices and principles, such as transparency, participation, reasoned decision, legality and effective 
review of rules and decisions. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15, 17. 
58 The selection of these FTAs is the result of a doctoral research project and its explanation goes beyond the scope of this Working 
Paper. Briefly, they represent post-Lisbon new generation of FTAs with major developed economies in North America and Asia. 
59 European Union's proposal for a legal text on Institutional, General and Final Provisions in TTIP, tabled for discussion with the US 
in the negotiating round of 11-15 July 2016 and made public on 14 July 2016 (hereafter TTIP). 
60 CETA is only a partial exception to this, in that the provisions on the domestic advisory groups are to be found under the chapter 
on trade and labour and the chapter on trade and environment. 
61 Art.X.6 TTIP. 
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Treaty bodies CETA TTIP EUSFTA EUJEPA 


























Working groups ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Contact points ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Domestic Advisory Groups ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Civil Society Forum ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Table No.2: Overview of the institutional architecture per trade agreement.63 
3.1. The Joint Committee and the Specialised Committees 
The establishment of Joint and Specialised committees is a common feature of EU international agreements. 
The EU FTAs under investigation are relatively similar in what they provide regarding the membership, 
mandate and decision-making of these bodies. Where they differ, reasons can be traced back to chronology or 
of regional trade partners. Regarding the former, the negotiations of EUSFTA largely preceded the 
politicisation of TTIP, which had an impact on CETA instead. In turn, many institutional provisions of CETA 
can be found replicated in EUJEPA. As a result, EUSFTA is the least ambitious in terms of institutional 
architecture, whereas TTIP can be placed at the opposite side of the spectrum. CETA and EUJEPA are quite 
similar in the structure and powers of their institutional bodies. Where they differ the most is in the interactions 
they envisage with the newly established bodies for civil society participation. This is where the regional divide 
between FTAs with North American and Asian trade partners can be clearly distinguished.  
Joint Committee 
All the trade agreements under investigation envisage the creation of a Joint Committee. ESUFTA in fact 
establishes a Trade Committee, which is nonetheless comparable to the Joint Committees of the other FTAs.64 
Regarding the membership, the Joint Committees are executive bodies formed by representatives of the EU 
and of the trade partner.65 They are co-chaired by the EU Commissioner for Trade and the partner’s Minister 
for Trade.66 Beyond the strict membership of the Joint Committees, this analytical dimension also leads to 
consider who can contribute to the work of the treaty body and influence its agenda. In some of the institutional 
chapters, the Parties recall the importance of considering the views of the public, as a way to “draw on a broad 
                                               
62 Art.12.15 EUSFTA establishes a Board on TSD. 
63 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
64 A Joint Committee is envisaged under its political counterpart, the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
65 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(1) TTIP, Art.16.1(1) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(1) EUJEPA.  
66 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(a) TTIP, Art.16.1(2) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(3) EUJEPA. 
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range of perspectives” in the implementation stage.67 However, when it comes to the functioning of the Joint 
Committee more specifically, the institutionalisation of interactions with the public is nearly absent.  
 
Image No.1: Interactions of the Joint Committee with nonstate actors per FTA.68 
CETA and EUSFTA stipulate that the Joint Committee may communicate with all interested parties, including 
the private sector and civil society organisations.69 In EUJEPA, the Joint Committee may provide information 
to the public, which yet suggests a debriefing opportunity, rather than an actual communication or exchange.70 
Only TTIP clearly mandates that the Joint Committee meet with the Civil Society Forum.71 Moreover, the 
institutional chapter proposal for TTIP would have also emphasised the importance of the Transatlantic 
Legislators Dialogue (TLD) and longed to “foster the parliamentary dimension” of the Agreement.72 Although 
this is unique in the history of EU FTAs, and it may have well enhanced the involvement of the parliaments 
from both sides, there are no provisions providing an express role for the TLD in the work of the Joint 
Committee. The place that the TLD would occupy in the operation of the Agreement thus remains unclear. By 
contrast, the TTIP proposal for regulatory cooperation of 2015 included a placeholder on the interaction of the 
RCB with legislative bodies.73   
Regarding the mandate, the main function of the Joint Committees is to supervise and facilitate the 
implementation and operation of the agreement.74 The scope of the activities of a Joint Committee can be said 
to encompass all the chapters of the FTA.75 At the same time, the provisions for the Joint Committee do not 
set out specific objectives it should follow, nor do the institutional chapters feature overarching objectives. By 
contrast, for instance, the chapters on regulatory cooperation in both TTIP and EUJEPA point at the promotion 
of good regulatory practices and of an effective, transparent and predictable regulatory environment as some 
of the objectives that these mechanisms should pursue and incorporate.76 Given the institutional provisions of 
the FTAs, however, the objectives of the Joint Committees appear to remain substantive, relating to the 
achievement of an effective operation of the entire FTA.  
Finally, as regards decision-making powers, the Joint Committee is the principal decisional treaty body. In all 
the trade agreements under investigation, the Joint Committee can adopt decisions, which shall be binding on 
the Parties. Under both CETA and TTIP, the effect of the decisions is subject to the Parties’ internal 
requirements and procedures.77 EUSFTA and EUJEPA omit this formula but stipulate that the Parties “shall 
                                               
67 Art.X.1(8) TTIP and Art.16.6 EUSFTA. TTIP also adds that this is relevant in the context of the domestic advisory groups and the 
Civil Society Forum, see Art.X.1(8) TTIP.  
68 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
69 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art.16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. 
70 Art.22.1(5)(c) EUJEPA. 
71 Art.X.1(9) TTIP. 
72 Art.X.6 TTIP. 
73 Art.14(6) TTIP proposal for regulatory Cooperation 2015. 
74 Only EUJEPA specifies the aim of ensuring that the Agreement “operates properly and effectively” as a basis for the allocation of 
powers to the Joint Committee, see Art.22.1(4) and 22.1(5) EUJEPA. Compare with Art.16.1(3)(a) EUSFTA “The Trade Committee 
shall ensure that this Agreement operates properly”. 
75 See e.g. Art.26.3 CETA. In TTIP, the Joint Committee would have also had specific duties in relation to regulatory cooperation. 
76 Art.18.1(1) EUJEPA and Art.x.1(1)(c) TTIP- EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation (21 March 2016). 
77 Art.26.4(1) and (2) CETA and Art.X.4 TTIP. 
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take the measures necessary to implement those decisions”.78 Likewise, CETA provides that the Parties “shall 
implement [the decisions]”, whereas TTIP is silent on the matter.79 In CETA and EUJEPA, the power of taking 
decisions rests not only on the Joint Committee, but it may be also exercised by the specialised committees.80 
These are presented next. 
Decision-making powers of the Joint Committee CETA TTIP EUSFTA EUJEPA 
Adopt decisions  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Adopt interpretations of the provisions of this Agreement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Resolve disputes regarding the interpretation of the agreement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Consider/adopt/recommend amendments ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Make recommendations on regulatory cooperation, including to the 
Transatlantic Regulators’ Forum 
✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
Table No.3 : Selected decision-making powers of the Joint Committee per trade agreement.81 
Specialised Committees 
Besides the Joint Committee, all the FTAs under investigation establish Specialised Committees responsible 
for monitoring the implementation of specific chapters. In terms of membership, just like the Joint Committees, 
the Specialised Committees are intergovernmental bodies composed of “representatives of the Parties”.82 
Regarding the mandate, they can be expected to work towards the achievement of the objectives of the chapters 
under their responsibility, where their functions are also specified. Whilst mainly reporting to the Joint 
Committee, and proposing draft decisions to it, in some cases they can also take decisions themselves: CETA 
and EUJEPA are two instances. As regards TTIP, nothing is mentioned about the possibility for specialised 
committees to adopt decisions.83 The wording in EUSFTA is also unclear as to whether the specialised 
committees can take decisions themselves, or if it is the Parties who take decisions in the specialised 
committees.84 The next paragraph zooms in to the newly introduced Specialised Committee responsible for the 
TSD chapter, where provisions regarding labour rights and the environment can be found. 
 
Specialised Committees CETA TTIP EUSFTA EUJEPA 
Take decisions  ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ 
Propose draft decisions for adoption by the Joint Committee ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ 
Inform the Joint Committee of their schedules and agenda ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
                                               
78 Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA and Art.22.2(1) EUJEPA. 
79 Art.26.4(2) CETA. 
80 Art.26.2(4) CETA and Art.22.3(5) EUJEPA. 
81 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
82 See i.a. Art.26.2(4) and Art.22.4(1) CETA; Art. 16.2(3), Art.2.15(1), Art.5.15 EUSFTA; Art.22.3(3)(b) EUJEPA. 
83 It could be inferred that decision-making would remain a prerogative of the Joint Committee, without yet excluding the possibility 
for it to allocate new tasks and powers to the specialised committees. 
84 Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA. The latter interpretation is corroborated by the absence of express decision-making powers under the 
relevant provisions on specialised committees. See Art.16.2 EUSFTA. 
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Report to the Joint Committee on results and conclusions from each 
meeting 
✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Table No.4: Selected decision-making powers of Specialised Committees and their tasks in relation to the Joint 
Committee.85 
 
Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development  
For the first time, EU FTAs comprise TSD Committees. This is above all because the EU has started including 
chapters on TSD with the new generation FTAs. However, only in CETA and EUJEPA is there a fully-fledged 
Committee on TSD. The institutional chapter of TTIP does refer to the establishment of a TSD Committee, 
which is however not elaborated in the EU textual proposal for the TSD chapter.86 Regarding EUSFTA, the 
Parties are required to establish a Board on TSD, in charge of overseeing the implementation of the chapter; 
no further powers or tasks are specified.87 A more extensive elaboration comes from the texts of CETA and 
EUJEPA. On membership, the TSD committees in CETA and EUJEPA have in common that they are required 
to interact with civil society. In CETA, the TSD Committee is expected to “promote transparency and public 
participation” and to publish any decision or report it produces;88 to hold a session with the public to discuss 
the implementation of the chapter;89 and to present updates on implementation to the Civil Society Forum, 
including annual reports as to its follow-ups on these communications.90 EUJEPA, by contrast, only provides 
that one of the functions of the TSD Committee is to interact with civil society, but does not elaborate further 
on this.91  
Regarding the scope of the mandate, the TSD Committee in both CETA and EUJEPA is given the task of 
monitoring the implementation of the relevant chapters.92 Except for the provisions on interaction with civil 
society, EUJEPA is more extensive than CETA in terms of the functions and powers of the TSD Committee. 
The latter is expected to make recommendations to the Joint Committee when reviewing and monitoring the 
chapter;93 to “seek solutions to resolve differences between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of 
this chapter”;94 and to pursue cooperation between its work and the activities of the ILO.95 By contrast, even 
though CETA allows specialised committees to propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee (and this could 
apply to the TSD Committee as well), the specific articles on the TSD Committee do not repeat nor add to 
this.96 As shown next, decision-making powers are centralised above all in the Joint Committees, with little if 
no opportunities for external actors to take part in the decision-making process nor in their meetings.  
3.2. Gaps of Participation in Centralised Decision-making powers 
In the implementation phase of FTAs, the Joint Committees are the main bodies that can take decisions, with 
no oversight mechanisms being applied to them. Significantly, Joint Committees can take decisions that will 
                                               
85 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
86 See EU textual proposal for the TSD Chapter at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf>. 
87 Art.12.15(3) EUSFTA. 
88 Art.22.4(4)(a) CETA. 
89 Art.22.4(3) CETA. 
90 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
91 Art.16.13(2)(c) EUJEPA. 
92 For CETA it includes the TSD chapter and also the chapters on Trade and Labour and Trade and Environment. See Art.22.4 
CETA. See, respectively, Articles 23.8(2) CETA for Trade and Labour and 24.13(3) CETA for Trade and Environment. 
93 Art.16.13(2)(a) EUJEPA. 
94 Art.16.13(2)(e) EUJEPA. 
95 Art.16.13(4) EUJEPA. 
96 Nonetheless, and unlike EUJEPA, CETA provides that the TSD Committee reviews the impact of the agreement on sustainable 
development (see Art.22.4(1) CETA). This is presented as an activity falling under its function to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement and it could be expected that the TSD Committee under EUJEPA would have the same task. 
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be binding under international law on the Parties, as well as under EU law on the EU and its Member States.97 
As decision-making remains a prerogative of intergovernmental bodies, a clear imbalance emerges between 
the strong executive presence and the lack of parliamentary involvement. None of the FTAs gives parliaments 
a say in decision-making by the Joint Committee. This may come as no surprise since external relations have 
historically pertained to the executive, and the implementation of trade agreements is not a task for 
parliaments.98 However, this should not lead to the conclusion that parliaments can be excluded from this stage 
and in the decision-making processes that follow. 
Above all, a key role of parliaments is to scrutinise and control the work of the executive. Regarding the 
implementation of EU FTAs, parliamentary scrutiny of treaty bodies becomes all the more important as their 
decision-making powers expand and encompass an indefinite range of issues with potential implications on 
fundamental rights.99 Some observe that the powers of the Joint Committees go beyond the mere executive 
implementation of obligations within the scope of the FTAs.100 It is precisely this expansion in nature and 
scope of powers that bolsters demands for parliamentary oversight. Furthermore, insofar as trade agreements 
deepen and politicise, the traditional domination of the executive becomes increasingly obsolete. Yet what we 
see in the implementation of EU FTAs is not a trend of more prominent role being granted to parliaments. 
Rather, more political functions are being attached to executive treaty bodies.101 The need of legitimation 
necessarily arises insofar as the authority beyond the State politicises.102 
The lack of parliamentary scrutiny of decision-making by treaty bodies is blatant on the EU side. In most third 
Parties the parliaments eventually come into play for passing implementing legislation. By contrast, the 
internal procedures at the EU level may easily sideline the EP.103 What follows explains how this can be so, 
by looking at the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms that the EP can exercise in the decision-making 
processes by treaty bodies: not only bilaterally (within the Joint Committee), but also domestically (at the EU 
                                               
97 Decisions become binding under international law by virtue of their adoption by the Joint Committee, as the EU can enter into 
international commitments following the simplified procedures of Articles 218(7) and 218(9) TFEU: in the case of CETA, the 
Council decided that the former was indeed the procedure to follow for the adoption of the decisions by the CETA Joint Committee. 
For a thorough explanation, see Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional constraints and  
proposals for strengthening the European Parliament' (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 532. Decisions are binding 
under EU law as a result of Art.216(2) TFEU, read in conjunction with case law that stipulates that treaty committees’ decisions 
constitute international agreements and form part of EU law (Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European 
Communities ECLI:EU:C:1989:422; C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1990:322). See Mario Mendez, 
The Legal Effects of EU Agreements (OUP 2013); Ramses Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of 
Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero 
(eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart 2016). 
98 Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA in the EU: Challenges for democracy and executive-legislative institutional balance due to 
the limited role of the European Parliament in the treaty bodies’ decision-making’ (paper presented at CETA Implications 
Conference CETA Implementation and Implications Project (CIIP), 27-28 September 2019, University Hall, Dalhousie University) 
(hereafter Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’). 
99 Ibid.  
100 Weiss (n 97) 536. 
101 Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’ (n 98) 7. 
102 Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zürn, ‘Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 137; Zürn and others, ‘International authority and its politicization’ (2012) 4 International Theory 69. 
103 Bart Kerremans and others, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world’ (2019) (Study requested by INTA 
Committee). 
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level). The graph below visualises the EP’s limitations in monitoring the executive at the bilateral and domestic 
level, both before and after a Joint Committee takes a decision. 
 
Graph No.1: EP’s limitations in decision-making.104 
In the early life-cycle of a treaty body decision, the EP lacks ex ante scrutiny powers, both at the bilateral and 
EU level. Bilaterally, the EP does not take part in the meetings of the treaty bodies and has no right to be 
informed. The Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission opens up the possibility for the EP 
to be invited to the meetings of bodies set up by multilateral agreements, which yet fails to capture bilateral 
FTAs.105 At the meetings of the Joint or specialised committees, the representatives of the Parties may find 
agreement on a decision. Yet before a decision is adopted at the bilateral level, the Council has to endorse the 
position to be taken on behalf of the Union within the treaty body. This is the step at the EU level where the 
EP is not involved and cannot exercise ex ante control. Following the simplified procedure of Article 218(9) 
TFEU, when a treaty body is called upon to adopt “acts having legal effects”,106 the Council shall rely on a 
proposal of the Commission to adopt a decision; this decision will represent the position to be taken by the EU 
negotiator within that treaty body.107 Via another simplified procedure, set out in Article 218(7) TFEU, the 
Council may directly authorise the Commission to approve amendments to an FTA by a treaty body. Together, 
these articles have been said to constitute “special regimes” whereby EU secondary law is adopted within 
treaty bodies.108  
Neither of these “special regimes” grant a say to the EP. Dawson has shown that the ordinary legislative 
procedure carries advantages for fundamental rights protection since it allows “articulating FR arguments that 
other forms of EU governance may not”.109 By contrast, fundamental rights may be neglected when policies 
are managed outside this procedure, “through institutional forms that lack the checks and balances the ordinary 
legislative process entails.”110 Given the EP’s lack of say in these special regimes, the EP carved out, in its 
rules of procedure, the possibility of issuing recommendations on the proposed positions.111 This shows an 
awareness of its lack of say in this process and an attempt to assert its role. At the same time, however, its 
recommendations would remain unilateral actions. The Commission would be under no duty to take them into 
account. On the other hand, while the EP has no right to be informed about the discussions of the treaty bodies, 
one can expect its right to be “immediately and fully informed”, as per Article 218 TFEU, to apply also at this 
                                               
104 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
105 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (OJ L304/47, 20.11.2010) 
26. 
106 With the exception of “acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement”, requiring ordinary 
legislative procedure. For a thorough discussion of Article 218(9) TFEU, see Alan Dashwood, ‘EU Acts and Member State Acts in 
the Negotiation, Conclusion and Implementation of International Agreements’ in Marise Cremona and Claire Kilpatrick (eds), EU 
Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations (OUP 2018); and Joni Heliskoski, ‘The Procedural Law of International Agreements: A 
Thematic Journey through Article 218 TFEU’ (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 79. 
107 This procedural legal basis was employed recently for the decisions by the Joint Committee of CETA (see European Commission, 
‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the CETA Joint 
Committee established under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of a decision setting out the administrative and 
organisational matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal’ COM(2019) 457 final, 2019/0217 (NLE), Brussels, 
11.10.2019) and by a Working Group of the EU-South-Korea FTA, see  Council Decision (EU) 2019/845 of 17 May 2019 on the 
position to be taken on behalf of the European Union, within the Working Group on Geographical Indications established by the Free 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, 
as regards the adoption of its rules of procedure (OJ L 138/84, 24.5.2019). For legal basis justification, see European Commission, 
“Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union, in the Working Group on 
Geographical indications set up by the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, as regards the adoption of its rules of procedure” (COM/2019/181 final). 
108 Weiss (n 97) 541. 
109 Dawson (n 42) 73. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Rule 109: Provisional application or suspension of the application of international agreements or establishment of the Union's 
position in a body set up by an international agreement. 
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domestic stage.112 As suggested by Weiss, a more meaningful control by the EP would involve a consent 
requirement before the Council adopts the position - something which could be enshrined in the Council’s 
decision approving the FTA.113  
After a position at the EU level is endorsed, the EP is absent once again at the bilateral level when a decision 
is adopted. Joint and Specialised committees take decisions by consensus.114 The EP has no formal role in this 
process. The power to take decisions exclusively rests on the executive intergovernmental bodies and defies 
parliamentary oversight. From an EU perspective, the dual source of democratic legitimacy, based on the 
representation by both the Council and the EP, is thereby compromised.115 It has been suggested that the EP 
should be made part of the representatives of the EU within the treaty bodies, or at least be granted an observer 
status and be informed throughout the process.116  
Once a decision at the bilateral level is adopted, the EP’s control mechanisms are again quite limited. At the 
EU level, the EP is not implicated when the decisions do not require ratification. All the trade agreements 
under investigation stipulate that the decisions will be binding upon the Parties.117 While the status of these 
decisions in EU law is disputed and controversial,118 what becomes problematic for the present argument is 
that in this process, even in the absence of direct effect, these decisions are liable to have legal effects on the 
EU legal order “without any subsequent act of adoption by the Union’s institutions”.119 The EP would remain 
outside this process. It has been suggested that the EP be given the possibility to suspend the decision.120 At 
the same time, bilaterally, the EP’s control powers are limited to its own-developed monitoring mechanisms, 
which would supervise the implementation of the decision and the FTA more broadly.121  
Overall, the EP’s role in the implementation phase has remained low profile. This is in stark contrast with the 
EP’s recently enhanced involvement in the negotiation and conclusion of EU FTAs, often praised for having 
enhanced the democratic quality of EU external trade. Yet an FTA does not stop at its entry into force. 
Implementation is a crucial phase in its life-cycle.122 The lack of parliamentary say during the implementation 
of an FTA goes to the detriment of the dual source of EU democratic legitimacy.123 Furthermore, an enhanced 
role during trade negotiations means the EP will be held responsible to meet its constituencies’ expectations. 124 
The EP is the only institution that could exercise political control and have a formal say in the process of 
decision-making, but from which it is yet excluded, both at the EU and bilateral level.  
3.3. The Outsiders to the Meetings of Treaty Bodies 
In the light of the previous discussion, the legitimacy of centralised decision-making powers could be enhanced 
by allowing the EP and civil society actors to join the meetings of the treaty bodies and to act as watchdogs of 
                                               
112 Article 218(10) TFEU. 
113 Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’ (n 98) 16. 
114 See i.a. Art.26.4(3) and Art.26.2(4) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(3) EUSFTA; Art.22.2(3) and Art.22.3(3)(e) EUJEPA. 
115 Thomas Verellen, ‘On Conferral, Institutional Balance and Non-binding International Agreements: The Swiss MoU Case’ (2016) 
1 European Papers 1225 (Insight). 
116 Weiss (n 97); Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega‐Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law 
(2013) 23 Constellations 58; Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 625.  
117 Art.26.4(2) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA; 22.2(1) EUJEPA. 
118 Ramses Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other 
Bodies in the European Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times 
of Crisis (Hart 2016). 
119  See Joni Heliskoski, ‘casenote on Case 370/07, Commission v. Council’ (2011) Common Market Law Review 555, 557-558. 
120 Weiss (n 98). 
121 Laura Puccio and Roderick Harte, ‘The European Parliament’s Role in Monitoring the Implementation of EU Trade Policy’ in 
Olivier Costa (ed), The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis (Palgrave 2019). 
122 Patrick Leblond, ‘Making the Most of CETA: A Complete and Effective Implementation Is Key to Realizing the Agreement's Full 
Potential’ (2016) CIGI Papers No. 114, 30 October 2016. 
123 Weiss (n 97) 552. 
124 Puccio and Harte (n 121). 
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the process. Where a certain institutional arrangement ensured that governments operate “in a responsive way 
to citizens’ preferences”, it could enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process.125 Arguably, to the 
extent that the EP and civil society actors were made formal members of those bodies, they could operate as a 
check on the work of executive bodies and provide a means of political control. As outlined in the analytical 
framework, the composition of institutions has an impact on agenda-setting. The EP and civil society could 
influence and expand the agenda in a way that reflects citizens’ concerns. This would also ensure that the 
democratic quality of EU external trade does not stop at the negotiation and conclusion of FTAs, but continues 
throughout their implementation. 
The absence of parliaments in the institutional architecture of EU FTAs can be compared with that of EU 
Association Agreements, which provide an insightful, existing alternative institutional design.126 For instance, 
the EU-Ukraine AA foresees a Parliamentary Association Committee composed of members of the EP and of 
the Ukrainian Parliament.127 Significantly, this body would have the power to request information on the AA 
implementation to the Association Council, the corresponding of the Joint Committee in FTAs; to be informed 
of decisions and recommendations; to make recommendations itself directly to the Association Council; and 
to create Parliamentary Association sub-committees.128 Exceptionally, the EU proposal for the institutional 
chapter of TTIP recognises the importance of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Dialogue, yet it fails to spell out 
the relationship with the Joint Committee or other specialised committees; this Dialogue would have not 
constituted a treaty body proper of the agreement.  
It could be argued that, compared to the EP, civil society actors may enjoy a more privileged place in the 
meetings of the Joint Committee: while some FTAs provide that the Joint Committee may communicate with 
civil society,129 nothing is mentioned about parliaments. At the same time, interaction with civil society is not 
compulsory and appears to remain a remote possibility. No provisions expressly provide that the Joint 
Committees are required to let representatives of civil society join their meetings. The agenda of the meeting 
of the CETA Joint Committee omitted any interaction or ex-post debrief session with civil society. The same 
occurred at the first meeting of the Joint Committee under EUJEPA.130 As to EUSFTA, no meetings appear to 
have taken place so far.131 
A slightly different picture emerges for the Specialised Committees. Regarding Regulatory Cooperation, 
CETA allows civil society to provide input, but not to join the meetings. “Registered stakeholders” can 
nonetheless attend the “stakeholders debrief session” following the meeting of the Regulatory Cooperation 
Forum.132 By contrast, no such debrief session was foreseen or took place at the first meeting of the EUJEPA 
Regulatory Cooperation Committee.133 Regarding the TSD Committees, it must be noted that CETA is replete 
with provisions for exchanges with civil society. Yet this is not the same as making those actors observers or 
true participants of the meetings. CETA lacks provisions to that effect. Still, at the end of its meetings, the 
                                               
125 Fritz W Scharpf (2003) in Puccio and Harte (n 121). 
126 See i.a. Art.121 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina AA (Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, OJ L 164, 30.6.2015, 2); Art.440 EU-
Moldova AA (Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, 4); Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA 
(Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 
161/3, 29.5.2014). 
127 Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA. 
128 Art.468 EU-Ukraine AA. 
129 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art. 16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. See also Image No.1. 
130 See European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Japan-EU EPA Joint Committee, 10 April 2019, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_157971.pdf>. 
131 No documents are available, see <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-singapore-agreement/index_en.htm>. 
132 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (1st Meeting of the CETA Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 14 December 2018) 4, available at < 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. See also Euroepan Commission, ‘CETA Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
– Stakeholder Debrief Meeting’ (4 February 2020), available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. 
133 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on 
Regulatory Cooperation, 20 January 2020, Video Conference), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158579.pdf>. 
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CETA TSD Committee has so far carried “meeting reviews” with civil society representatives belonging to 
the DAGs.134 The review includes a debrief session, where the TSD Committee informs the DAGs of its 
discussions;135 views are then exchanged with the DAGs chairs, which allows them to provide feedback to the 
TSD Committee’s work plan, to present their Joint Statement, and to inform the TSD Committee on the 
discussions at the Civil Society Forum.136 Conversely, once again, the first meeting of the EUJEPA TSD 
Committee held no dedicated sessions with civil society.137  
It appears that the disparity across trade agreements in what they provide on external participation is also 
reflected in the role of parliaments and civil society in the implementation process. Still, CETA is an exemplary 
case of effort and best practices going beyond what is provided under the agreement itself. The late 
politicisation of its negotiation has prompted huge interest by many civil society actors in scrutinising its 
implementation. Considering that such best practices have not triggered in the context of EUJEPA, it could be 
questioned how these informal practices left to the discretion of the Parties compare with what could be a 
legally-embedded and more meaningful participation in the actual meetings. 
4. The New Treaty Bodies Institutionalising Civil Society 
Participation 
For the first time with the new generation of EU trade agreements, the institutional architecture of EU FTAs 
encompasses a prominent civil society dimension. While not taking part in the meetings proper, civil society 
actors are tasked with monitoring and providing views on the implementation, in particular of the TSD chapter. 
The involvement of civil society reflects a renewed effort to engage with it beyond the negotiation stage. Two 
main bodies stand out which increasingly institutionalise the participation of civil society at this stage: the 
Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs), one to be created domestically by each trade partner; and the Civil Society 
Forum (CSF), working at the bilateral level. While the Joint and Specialised committees enjoy a few 
differences across FTAs, the way the role and place of civil society is institutionalised in the implementation 
stage is where the FTAs differ the most, along what can be clearly identified as a regional divide of North 
American and Asian trade partners. 
4.1. The Domestic Advisory Groups and the Civil Society Forum 
Domestic Advisory Groups 
The DAGs are a unique and novel feature of the Post-Lisbon trade agreements. All the FTAs under 
investigation mandate each Party to convene or establish their own new domestic advisory group, or to consult 
an already existing one.138 At the moment of writing, the EU and the respective trade partners have established 
                                               
134 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 September 2018 Brussels), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157266.pdf>; and European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting 
of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at  
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/november/tradoc_158424.11.19%20(for%20publication).pdf>.  
135 Ibid.  
136 European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>. 
137 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on Trade 
and Sustainable Development, 29-30 January 2020, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158594.pdf>. 
138 In general, provisions on the DAGs are to be found in the TSD chapters, under the heading of institutional mechanisms. EUSFTA 
and EUJEPA reflect this practice, whereas CETA is slightly different, due to the Canadian preference to have two separate DAGs, 
one for the chapter on Trade and Labour and one for the chapter on Trade and the Environment, and which are thus established 
therein. TTIP would have differed more significantly, inasmuch as it would have established the DAGs under the overarching 
institutional chapter. This way, it would have recognised them a constitutive part of the institutional architecture of the Agreement. 
 20 
EUTIP WORKING PAPER 03/2020 
the DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA, but not for EUSFTA.139 Regarding the membership, the DAGs consist of 
a small number of civil society representatives and permanent observers.140 Most FTAs stipulate that there 
shall be a “balanced representation” of employers and workers organisations, as well as business, social and 
environmental stakeholders.141 The EU DAGs accordingly comprise three groups: representatives of the 
employers, of the workers, and the so-called “third interests”.142 The Rules of Procedure of the EU DAGs of 
both CETA and EUJEPA also provide that the EU Commission is to be systematically invited to participate in 
the EU DAGs meetings.143 This is not the case for the EP, which shall be updated on the DAG work 
programme.144 Regarding the DAGs of trade partners, Canada has decided to have one DAG for labour, and 
one DAG on environment. Unlike for the DAG on environment,145 at the time of writing there is no record of 
the establishment of the DAG for labour. It is uncertain whom it encompasses, beyond those that were 
mentioned at the Civil Society Forum on 12 September 2018146 and at the CSF in November 2019.147 Japan 
has followed Canada’s approach in having two different DAGs. The DAG for labour comprises the Labour 
Policy Council,148 which is an advisory body of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: albeit composed 
of representatives of the workers, of the employers and of public interest, its members are appointed by the 
Ministry.149 
Regarding the mandate, the DAGs have an advisory and consultative role: they provide views and advice to 
the Parties on the implementation of the TSD chapter. The proposal of TTIP differs from the other FTAs in 
that it would have extended scope of their oversight to the entire agreement.150 While the DAGs have no 
decision-making powers comparable to those of the Joint or Specialised committees, they can nonetheless 
“submit views and recommendations” on their own initiative.151 According to their Rules of Procedure, the EU 
DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA may invite the trade-partner DAG to hold a DAG-to-DAG meeting152 and may 
also decide on their contribution to the CSF.153 This process will involve “a decision” to be taken as to which 
views or recommendations will be provided. Within the EU DAGs in particular, it has reportedly proven a 
                                               
As shown below, this would have also been reflected in the scope of their mandate. See Articles 23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA - 
Institutional mechanisms; Art.X.7 TTIP - Domestic Advisory Groups; Art.12.15 EUSFTA - Institutional Set up; Art.16.15 EUJEPA - 
Domestic advisory group. 
139 The statement of the non-establishment of the DAGs for EUSFTA is based on the answers received by Europe Direct by email.  
140 18 for CETA and 12 for EUJEPA. See respective rules of procedure, RoP 2.1 EU DAG for CETA and RoP 2.1 EU DAG for 
EUJEPA, available at <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/final_rules_of_procedure_-_eu_dag_for_japan.pdf> and  
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/en_rules_of_procedure_for_eu_dag_for_ceta_0.pdf>. 
141 Art.23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA; Art.X.7 TTIP; Art.12.15 EUSFTA. The Rules of Procedure of the EU DAG for EUJEPA yet 
prescribes this balanced representation. 
142 The European Economic and Social Committee is responsible for the secretariat and has replicated its organisation into the 
composition of the DAGs. 
143 RoP 11.1 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.1 EU DAG on EUJEPA. 
144 RoP 11.3 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.3 EU DAG on EUJEPA. 
145 See Government of Canada, ‘Canadians appointed to environment international advisory committees’, available at 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/canadian-appointed-advisory-
commitees.html> 
146 Namely Jocelyne Dubois (Director, International Department, Canadian Labour Congress, the largest trade union in Canada), and 
Derrick Hynes (President and CEO of FETCO, Federally Regulated Employers – Transportation and Communications), see 
recording of the CETA 1st Civil Society Forum Meeting (12.09.2018), available at <https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/ceta-1st-civil-
society-forum-meeting>. 
147 Among which Kelly Pike (Assistant Professor at the University of York, Canada), see Video recording of the Forum provided by 
email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements Secretariat (TCT) Global 
Affairs Canada. 
148 See presentation by Eve Päärenson (EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee), ‘EU-Japan EPA and the role foreseen for civil 
society’, available at <http://www.office.kobe-u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-
4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf> 
149 See website of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (google translated) 
<https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/roudouzenpan/roudouseisaku/index.html> 
150 Art.X.7(1) EU TTIP proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions. 
151 Ibid. In EUJEPA, this is not expressly mentioned, but it can be expected that the DAGs would have similar opportunities to do so. 
To submit such recommendations, a DAG adopts declarations which have to be consented to and voted by its members.  
152 RoP 13.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 13.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA. 
153 RoP 13.2 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 13.2 EU DAG for EUJEPA. 
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difficult task given the diverging views among members of the DAG,154 which can be added to the concerns 
raised at the Civil Society Forum, by several civil society actors not belonging to the DAG. 
 
Civil Society Forum 
In the absence of DAG-to-DAG meetings, the CSF is what brings together the DAGs from each Party, and in 
most cases also other members of civil society not belonging to the DAGs. Among the FTAs investigated, 
EUSFTA is the only agreement not envisaging the creation of a joint dialogue of civil society.155 Regarding 
the membership, CETA, TTIP and EUJEPA all stipulate that the CSF comprises both the DAGs of each Party 
and other representatives of civil society, following a criterion of “balanced representation.”156 The role of 
these CSFs is to “conduct a dialogue”, its subject matter encompassing: the chapter on TSD in EUJEPA; 
“sustainable development aspects of this Agreement” in CETA; and “the implementation and application of 
this Agreement” in TTIP.157 The CSFs do not take decisions themselves and their purpose appears to be limited 
to providing a platform for deliberative discussion on a wide range of issues. However, other provisions reveal 
that the CSF can submit views and opinions. How CSFs interact with the Joint and Specialised Committees, 
and the venues to do so, are discussed next. 
4.2. Members without Centralised Decision-making powers 
Unlike the Joint and Specialised committees, the DAGs and the CSF do not have decision-making powers. As 
shown, they may nonetheless submit views and opinions. To whom, depends: for the DAGs, on their Rules of 
Procedure; and for the CSF, on the trade agreement. What becomes interesting for centralisation is to examine 
how the CSF and DAGs relate to each other, and most importantly how they interact with the 
intergovernmental treaty bodies that take decisions. Arguably, the more centralisation and the shorter the 
reporting chain from one treaty body to another, the better for accountability and organisational efficiency. It 
will be shown that while trade agreements might provide a certain procedure, the actual practice has developed 
otherwise and inconsistently across trade partners. The organisational confusion and the absence of follow-up 
requirements inevitably creates accountability concerns. 
Regarding the DAGs, the Rules of Procedure of the EU DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA are similar: views can 
be expressed in recommendations and/or communications adopted by consensus;158 these views then may be 
submitted to a series of bodies: from the TSD Committee and the Parties to the Agreement, to EU institutions, 
the trade-partner DAG and any other relevant body.159 The DAGs can therefore decide who the target for their 
recommendations may be. EUSFTA is the only agreement that expressly stipulates that the DAGs may submit 
their recommendations directly to the Parties.160 It does not, however, establish a CSF. On the CSF, different 
FTAs provide different modalities of interaction. The image below shows the relations between the CSF, the 
TSD Committee and the Joint Committee as provided by the texts of the agreements. It highlights the extension 
of the reporting chain before the outcome of the CSF deliberations arrive at the main decision-makers, i.e. the 
Joint Committee and/or the Parties. However, looking at the operation of these treaty bodies on the ground, it 
                                               
154 Informal interview with EESC representative.  
155 As for the other FTAs, provisions on a CSF are to be found in the TSD chapters (see Art.22.5 CETA; Art.X.8 TTIP; Art.16.16 
EUJEPA), with the exception of TTIP which establishes it under the institutional chapter (Art.X.8 TTIP Institutional Proposal).   
156 Art.22.5(2) CETA; Art.X.8(2) TTIP; Art.16.16(2) EUJEPA. This is also repeated in the Rules of Procedures of the EU DAGs for 
CETA and EUJEPA. 
157 Art.23.8(4) CETA; Art.X.7(1) TTIP; Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA; Art.16.15(1) EUJEPA. 
158 See e.g. RoP 6.1 and 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.4 EU DAG for EUJEPA.  
159 RoP 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA. CETA also expressly mentions the Panel of Experts and the Civil 
Society Forum. Since both are bodies that are also created under EUJEPA, it may be expected that “any other relevant body” 
encompasses them as well. 
160 Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA. 
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emerges that the FTAs provide only a starting point on how different bodies should interact, leaving a wide 
margin of discretion as to who can report what, to whom and when.  
 
 
Image No.2: Interactions between different treaty bodies as per the text of the trade agreements.161 
In the context of CETA, representatives of the DAGs have so far taken part in the Forum and then reported to 
the TSD Committee the following day, in the last sessions of the TSD committee meetings: they have informed 
the TSD committee of the CSF discussions, presented their joint statement, and given feedback. While this 
would suggest that the TSD Committee and the CSF as a whole have not interacted directly, in fact the TSD 
Committee has presided over the CSF, which means a chance for it to become acquainted with the views raised 
by civil society. The CSF in any case seems to work as a background platform where different issues are 
discussed, before these are presented to the TSD Committee by the DAGs Co-Chairs. Following the Rules of 
Procedure, the CETA Joint Committee will be informed by the Specialised committees on the conclusions of 
the meetings of the TSD Committees.162 It can be hoped that the TSD Committee will also report on its 
discussions with the DAGs, and will thus inform the Joint Committee about civil society’s opinions.  
In the context of EUJEPA, the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society has followed a different path. At its first 
meeting, “participants of civil society” exchanged views directly with “representatives of the EU Commission 
and the Government of Japan.”163 While it can be expected that civil society comprised the DAGs of each 
side,164 it is not clear whether the representatives of the Parties were members of the TSD Committee, as 
provided by the text of EUJEPA. Unlike the practice developed for CETA, the first meeting of the EU-Japan 
                                               
161 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
162 RoP 14 Council decision (EU) 2018/1062 of 16 July 2018 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within 
the CETA Joint Committee established by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the CETA Joint 
Committee and specialised committees, OJ L 190/13 (27.7.2018). 
163 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Trade And Sustainable Development Joint Dialogue with Civil Society, 31 january 2019), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158578.pdf>. 
164 See presentation by Eve Päärendson, EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee, at <http://www.office.kobe-
u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf>. 
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TSD Committee did not include any exchange of views with the DAGs Co-chairs.165 However, both sides 
confirmed that the views expressed by the DAGs on the TSD chapter implementation “would be duly 
received.”166 They also decided on a number of issues related to the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society: i.a., that 
the Dialogue would have been organised by TSD Committee and be held back-to-back with the TSD 
Committee; and its minutes be made publicly available.167 As the minutes of the Joint Dialogue have not been 
published,168 it is not possible to assess whether the views voiced at the Dialogue have influenced the decisional 
bodies. Furthermore, unlike CETA, the specialised committees are not required to report to the Joint 
Committee on the conclusions of their meetings.169 No follow-up requirements are demanded to the Joint 
Committee, nor to the TSD Committee.  
CETA is the only FTA which expressly requires the TSD Committee to report back to the CSF on the follow-
up to the views of civil society presented to the Parties.170 This unique provision can be expected to enhance 
accountability and reason-giving processes. It must still be seen, however, how it will be used. So far, the 
Rules of Procedures of the Joint and Specialised committees are silent on the matter. Furthermore, as the 
recordings of the Forum discussions are not made publicly available but only its summaries,171 it is not easy to 
assess the Joint Committee’s measures in the light of civil society’s demands. Importantly, the TSD Committee 
itself could also propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee. This seems to have been the case for the three 
recommendations (on SMEs, climate and gender) that the Joint Committee adopted at its first meeting, and 
which the TSD Committee reports to have prepared in the framework of the work on TSD implementation.172 
Absent the report of the first EU-Canada CSF meeting, it is not possible to draw a causal relation between the 
Forum discussions and the above-mentioned recommendations. Some members of civil society in fact 
denounce the aleatory targeting of certain issues, which conceal and prevent progress on other more pressing 
(“the real”) issues.173 Eventually, the CETA TSD Committee remains free to set its own agenda and decide 
which recommendations it may make to the Joint Committee.174 
The institutional design for FTAs implementation creates high dispersion of civil society and centralisation of 
decision-making powers in the Joint Committee - itself not in direct contact with civil society. Participation of 
civil society is fragmented across several venues, exacerbating coordination to advance recommendations to 
other bodies.175 What might appear already a complex structure to the members of EU civil society, becomes 
even more confusing for partner countries’ civil society, who can easily get lost in the identification of their 
main interlocutors.176 Besides the dispersion of civil society, what lacks is a clear relationship between civil 
                                               
165 See Joint Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development under the Agreement between the 
European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (Tokyo, 29-30 January 2020), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158664.pdf>. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
168 See list of ‘EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) - Meetings and documents’ currently available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2042>.  
169 See RoP of the EU-Japan Joint Committee, Decision No 1/2019 of 10 April 2019 of the Joint Committee of the EU-Japan EPA 
[2019/1035] OJ L167/81 (24.6.2019); compare with RoP 14(3) of the EU-Canada Joint Committee (n 162). 
170 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
171 With the exception of the first meeting of the EU-Canada CSF on 12 September 2018 (see EU-Canada Civil Society Forum: 
Trade and Sustainable Development under CETA at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/events/index.cfm?id=1901>) and the joint 
statements by the DAGs, see “Joint Statement of the Canadian and European Domestic Advisory Groups” mentioned at the Meeting 
of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable development (Ottawa, 13 November 2019), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>. 
172 See European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, Brussels, 13 
September 2018), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157409.pdf>.  
173 Informal interview with representative of civil society. 
174 RoP 8 of the CETA Joint Committee, to be read in conjunction with RoP 14(4). 
175 See Diana Potjomkina, ‘Multistakeholderism in the EU’s Trade Governance’ (Institute for European Studies, Issue 2018/01, 
October 2018). 
176 E.g. EESC went to Japan on 6 February 2020 and discussed issues pertaining to the TSD Committee and the DAGs (even though 
the EESC is part of the EU DAG on EUJEPA), <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/news/eesc-members-visit-japan-talk-
trade-and-sustainable-development-authorities-and-civil-society-organisations>. 
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society and the decisional bodies.177 The Joint Committee for EUJEPA has recognised that “there exist many 
frameworks for policy dialogues” and recommended different bodies seek “synergies”.178 As shown, the 
interactions between civil society and the committees are highly inconsistent and discretionary across FTAs. 
Members of the DAGs harshly criticise not being informed about proposals and their lack of involvement 
throughout the process.179 Finally, the committees are not required to account to civil society for their 
decisions.180 Possibly with the exception of CETA, they have no follow-up duties. The combination of 
organisational confusion and lack of accountability mechanisms misses the aim of increased democratic 
legitimacy for EU trade policy. While recent developments reveal that civil society actors have successfully 
employed the monitoring tools at their disposal, there still remain several gaps in what they can monitor and 
influence. 
4.3. The Gaps in the Mandate 
The new bodies institutionalising civil society participation are not expected to monitor the impact of the FTAs 
on fundamental rights; nor to deliberate on them. The DAGs and the CSF belong to the TSD chapter, and are 
required to facilitate and monitor the implementation of that chapter. Yet in the TSD chapters, fundamental 
rights typically remain limited to labour standards; the DAGs and the CSF will not monitor, for instance, data 
privacy rights in the context of e-commerce. The narrow scope of their mandate has consequences on the 
agenda of their meetings, not least on what these bodies understand to be their role. The EU’s TTIP proposal 
is the only one, among the other FTAs, that would have instructed the CSF to conduct a dialogue on the 
implementation of the entire agreement. Recently, demands by EU civil society actors to enlarge the scope of 
the mandate to the whole agreement have been met.181 
It is argued here that the widening of the scope, however, does not necessarily correspond to a mandate for 
fundamental rights. The latter would coincide, i.a., with an instance where civil society were asked to 
appreciate and monitor the impact of certain aspects of the FTA on fundamental rights. These aspects would 
not necessarily have to fall under the TSD chapter, but could also be found somewhere else in the trade 
agreement. At the same time, however, the demands to broaden the scope of the mandate were not motivated 
by this interpretation, nor have they this effect. On the motivation, demands for expanding the mandate find in 
fact their origin in the will, by the business component of the EU DAGs, to be granted a role in the 
implementation of FTA chapters other than that on TSD. In this regard, some civil society actors condemn the 
lack of a clear scope of action of the DAGs, as everything could be on their agenda.182 A wider agenda might 
indeed take away room for discussion on matters related to e.g. trade and labour, since other economic matters 
pertaining to the FTA could be prioritised. 
Regarding the implications, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the agreement does not mean 
monitoring its impact on something else (as could be fundamental rights); or facilitating the realisation of 
                                               
177 Potjomkina (n 175). 
178 First Meeting of the Joint Committee under EUJEPA, ‘Joint Minutes’, available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158381.pdf>. 
179 See i.a. intervention by Lina Carr (ETUC) and Tanja Buzek (EESC) at Civil Society Forum November 2019. Video recording of 
the Forum provided by email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements 
Secretariat (TCT) Global Affairs Canada. The recording is not available online. 
180 See on this Jan Orbie and others, ‘Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil society mechanisms in EU 
trade agreements’ (2016) 1 Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 526. On the methodological challenges, see Jennifer A Zerk, 
‘Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements’ (2019) (Chatham House Research Paper). 
181 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, ‘The role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the 
implementation of Free Trade Agreements’ (adopted 15 January 2019), available at <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-
work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/role-domestic-advisory-groups-monitoring-implementation-free-trade-agreements>; 
Non paper of the Commission services, ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and 
Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (26 February 2018), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf> (hereafter: European Commission, ‘Non-paper’) 
182 Informal interview with civil societ representatives.  
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something falling outside its scope. This is problematic in the quasi-absence of fundamental rights in FTAs, 
as there would be very little to monitor in their respect. The European Commission understands the role of 
civil society mechanisms as a means for continuous analysis of the “effectiveness” of the TSD chapters.183 
While crucial, such an understanding omits and prevents examinations of intrinsic linkages between other 
sections of the FTAs and fundamental rights. It also excludes ex-post evaluations of the negative impacts 
envisaged in the ex-ante sustainability impact assessments. The methodology of the ex-post impact 
assessments of EU FTAs corroborates this observation.184 While stakeholders may be consulted, the DAGs 
and the CSF have no formal role in ex-post monitoring processes. In any case, they are not required, as per 
their role, to check that implementation of an FTA respects fundamental rights. Their duty is to ensure that the 
commitments of the Parties under the agreement are fulfilled. As they are not demanded to monitor the impact 
on fundamental rights, deliberation on these issues also risks remaining on the margins.  
The DAGs and the CSF still represent unique institutionalised channels for regular meetings. Periodic 
interaction and horizontal exchanges between EU and partner countries’ civil society are likely to benefit  
information-sharing and can be conducive to policy learning and innovation.185 The experience with CETA so 
far shows that the CSF can work as a platform for dialogue on i.a. cooperation on labour standards with third 
FTA partners, and as a springboard for joint initiatives, such as joint workshops with labour and civil society 
on collective bargaining.186 The agenda of the EU-Canada CSF was also open to “any other issues”, albeit 
limited to the field of TSD. Particularly at this stage, civil society actors should prompt discourses on the 
relationship between trade and fundamental rights, how it should be understood and the way forward.  
5. Assessing the Values for Fundamental Rights in the 
Institutional Architecture of EU FTAs 
The analysis of the institutional design of EU FTAs informs as to what extent the institutional architecture of 
EU FTAs is designed in a way that it can safeguard and promote fundamental rights. Building on the analytical 
framework, this section assesses the findings in the light of values of participation, representation, deliberation 
and accountability. Arguably, where an institutional design met these values in a way that could contribute to 
fundamental rights, it could ensure that fundamental rights are not neglected at the implementation stage. 
As to participation, mechanisms have been introduced for civil society yet not for the EP. Civil society enjoys 
a formal role in the implementation of TSD chapters, via the meetings of the CSF and the DAGs. The EU is 
increasingly forcing and forging new entities that appear to streamline civil society participation, and also 
opening up venues for civil society actors to provide their views and opinions. Yet when it comes to 
participation in decision-making, neither civil society or the EP have a say; they do not take part in the meetings 
of the Joint and Specialised Committees, but only interact with them in differing and confusing formats. The 
“institutional layering” - namely the addition as opposed to the improvement of the interactions with already 
existing institutions187 - has resulted in the creation of too many entities and mechanisms: they have 
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overcrowded the institutional architecture of EU FTAs and “fatigued” participation by interested parties.188 
DAGs have been created for each FTA, but the coordination, organisational and financial consequences only 
realised at a later stage.189 All this has arguably an impact on participation of those representing citizens. 
When it comes to representation, the institutional architecture of EU FTAs entails that citizens are represented 
by civil society actors; the EP has no place in treaty bodies, nor it has a treaty body for itself. The DAGs can 
be understood as representing wider segments of civil society in their turn. Alongside the Civil Society Forum, 
the creation of these bodies is to be welcomed as a unique effort at institutionalising civil society in the 
operation of FTAs. In fact, this may come as no surprise given the EU’s history and tendency at creating 
agencies and institutions against informality. Yet the DAGs and the CSF have been conceived above all as ad 
hoc advisory bodies. They remain much less formalised and on the margin than other treaty bodies for the 
implementation of EU FTAs. Their absence from the chapters on institutional provisions clearly hints at this. 
Furthermore, while EU DAGs include a balanced representation of interests and are in close contact with the 
EP, the picture is more problematic for countries where civil society is nearly absent, or is in fact an emanation 
of the state (Singapore) or limited to academics (Japan). This begs the thorny question of how and by whom 
citizens can be represented. The EU is leading in this regard, which does not exclude ample room for 
improvement. As to the EP, its gradual empowerment in external trade should be extended to the 
implementation stage, by providing the EP with a body or platform to engage.  
In terms of deliberation, the new entities institutionalising civil society are unique also in their effect of 
enabling dialogue on a series of issues related to trade. They do not, however, create a platform with a clear 
mandate for deliberation or monitoring on fundamental rights. Implementation of EU FTAs is limited to what 
can be found therein. It remains at the discretion of the actors engaged in those bodies whether to add initiatives 
going beyond the scope of the FTAs. CETA shows that under best practices of transparency and regular 
exchanges with civil society, this could be possible. As discussed, however, it still has to be seen whether 
deliberations will touch upon issues relating to fundamental rights, and whether they will reach the agenda of 
the decisional treaty bodies. For sure, horizontal dialogues between EU and partner countries’ civil society 
have value in themselves and can lead to normative institutional change and development. This is why the 
mandate of the DAGs and CSF should put more emphasis on exploring the normative relationships between 
trade and fundamental rights, so as to trigger discussions thereon. This should also inform a role for them that 
included ongoing on-the-ground monitoring of the impact of trade on fundamental rights. As to the TSD 
committees, also their mandate excludes monitoring of fundamental rights. Other attributes could be well 
relevant to their work as much as to that of other treaty bodies: these would be overarching objectives setting 
i.a. how and according to which normative principles the implementation of the agreement should be carried 
out. 
Regarding accountability, what emerges is a stark contrast between centralisation of decision-making and 
decentralisation of decision-takers. It has been shown that decision-making powers are centralised in the Joint 
Committees, without political control by the EP or civil society. The Joint Committees may take decisions 
liable to have consequences on fundamental rights, with no mechanisms of review or challenge.190 By contrast, 
the participation of civil society is highly dispersed, and its procedures to take decisions on e.g., submission 
of views, decentralised and requiring coordination among different fora. Even though civil society can interact 
with the Joint and Specialised Committees, it has no input on decision-making; and while it can submit views, 
no accountability mechanisms are in place requiring the Joint or Specialised committees to follow up on their 
views.191 Most problematic, it is not clear how issues raised would possibly be filtered and selected in the 
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context of a multitude of insights. One can hardly conclude that the outcome of the deliberations will be 
translated into recommendations or other measures. In the light of no institutionalised democratic procedures 
for decision-making,192 the scholarship on Global and Administrative Law could provide insights to 
overarching objectives for the institutional chapters and for decision-making processes.193 The annex to the 
EU textual proposal for regulatory cooperation in TTIP on the institutional set up is illuminating in this respect: 
it identifies “political accountability”, “effective coordination” and “transparency” as essential elements for 
the institutional set-up of regulatory cooperation activities.194 It recognises that an institutional architecture 
requires some normative, “good governance” anchors. Attaching these principles to the institutional chapters 
of EU FTAs would enhance democratisation, as an ongoing endeavour;195 it would mean designing and 
institutionalising processes that are informed by aims of democratic governance, as opposed to policy 
effectiveness.196 
6. Conclusion 
The present evaluation reveals that the EU is leading globally and has made huge steps when it comes to 
involving civil society at the implementation stage, but it still lags behind on accountability and meaningful 
participatory mechanisms, and on an institutional design that could truly lead in the protection of fundamental 
rights in governance beyond the State. It shows that the proliferation of treaty bodies for the implementation 
of EU FTAs has not equated with an institutional architecture that takes into consideration fundamental rights. 
The institutional design falls short of being embedded in the values that could help safeguard their respect. 
Taking together elements of membership, mandate and decision-making powers for purposes of evaluating 
representation, participation, deliberation and accountability, the emerging picture is one that leads to foresee 
little consideration of fundamental rights at the implementation stage. The EU can contribute to progressive 
international economic law by enhancing, empowering and institutionalising the participation of EP and civil 
society actors in the implementation process of FTAs - which should not be limited to the FTA itself - but 
provide a platform for further cooperation discussion and deliberation.  
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